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CURRENT LEGISLATION
AND DECISIONS
NOTES
CAB

-

Administrative Law

-

Official Notice

In 1965 the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) granted Northeast Airlines a temporary permit authorizing flights from New York to Florida
for five years.' However, Northeast was unable to capture a substantial
share of the total air traffic and as a result suffered tremendous losses.
Subsequently, the Board refused Northeast's application for a permanent
certificate. Upon review, the First Circuit Court of Appeals remanded the
case for a more explicit statement.' The Board affirmed its original decision, concluding that the old record, corroborated by more recent evidence, did not warrant a reopening of the case. Northeast petitioned for
review of the Board's affirmation and for an order directing the Board to
consider further evidence. Held, remanded: When the Board elected to
look at matters outside the record, it necessarily had to give Northeast the
opportunity to rebut not only those matters considered, but also any inferences which were sought to be drawn therefrom.' Due process could
permit no less.4 Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 484 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 845 (1965). Subsequently, on 26 April 1965 the
Board revoked its two preceding decisions, stating that it wished to "reopen the proceeding for a complete review of the issues." Accordingly,
it requested the court to remand for that purpose, and on 11 May 1965
the court remanded the case to the Board and relinquished its jurisdiction.'
The increase in importance of administrative agencies has been brought
about as Congress and the state legislatures have found themselves lacking
in both time and expertise to prescribe all the detailed rules and regulations necessary to deal effectively with the complex and highly technical
fields of the "jet age." Legislatures have resorted to the enactment of
SNew York-Florida Case, 24 C.A.B. 94 (1956).
'Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 331 F.2d 579 (1st Cir. 1964).
'The court relied on Section 7(d) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 60 Stat. 241 (1946),
5 U.S.C. § 1006(d) (1964), which states:
The transcript of testimony and exhibits, together with all papers and requests filed
in the proceeding, shall constitute the exclusive record for decision. . . . Where any
agency decision rests on official notice of a material fact not appearing in the evidence
in the record, any party shall on timely request be afforded an opportunity to show
the contrary.
"The court was remanding the Board's affirmation of its original decision on Northeast's application for a permanent certificate. After reviewing the Board's original order, the First Circuit
found that the reasons given by the Board for denying renewal of Northeast's permit were either
irrelevant or inadequately developed and remanded for further study. On 1 December 1964, the
Board affirmed its original decision, again denying Northeast's application.
'Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 488 (1st Cir.), cerl. denied, 382 U.S. 845 (1965).
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broad general statutes which state the overall objectives intended by the
legislature, the methods by which these objectives are to be achieved, and
certain standards to serve as guides for the exercise of the powers given
to the agencies. It is left to the agencies themselves to promulgate the
various detailed policies and rules by which it carries out the legislative
purpose. The power to investigate any matter within an agency's jurisdiction is usually conferred by statute. The agencies have used various
investigatory procedures such as subpoenas,' examination of books and
records,7 inspection of premises,' and requirement of reports.! The courts
will uphold the use of these means if (1) the investigation was authorized
by the agency's statute, (2) Congress or the state legislature had the
power to authorize the investigation, (3) the information sought was relevant, and (4) the scope of the investigating powers was not too broad."0
Another procedure for obtaining information used in making agency
decisions is official notice. An agency can take official notice not only of
factors which are of common knowledge and notoriety, but also of any
factual matter of a general nature which its experience has shown to be
true." However, official notice has no effect other than to relieve one of
the parties to a controversy of the burden of resorting to the usual forms
of evidence."2 This practice is allowed because it facilitates administrative
proceedings. For example, in Railroad Comm'n v. McDonald"3 the court
stated that where the issuance of a license to operate a common or contract
carrier depends on whether public convenience requires service between
two cities, the Commission should be able to rely on conclusions reached in
a recent hearing on a similar application concerning the same route. The
Commission should not be required to put into the record again all the
facts it had learned a few weeks before. 4 However, the courts have placed
various limitations on the exercise of this power. When an agency proposes to take official notice of certain facts, adequate notice to all parties
is required," and the parties must be given a chance to rebut or explain
any fact or inference derived therefrom. A failure to comply with these
two requirements constitutes a denial of due process. In ICC v. Louisville
& N.R.R., 7 the Court stated that all parties should be fully appraised of
any evidence outside the record which the Commission chose to utilize in
making its decision. The parties, in defense of their positions, should be
6

Fleming v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 114 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1940).
'FTC v. National Biscuit Co., 18 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
'Farmer's Elevator Co. v. Chicago, RI. & Pac. Ry., 226 Ill. 567, 107 N.E. 841 (1915).
'United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950).
" Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
" Cooper, Official Notice by Administrative Agencies as Substitute for Evidence, 29 Mich.
S.B.J. No. 1, p. 25 (1950). Examples of the expansion of official notice of a wide variety of facts
deemed readily susceptible to objective ascertainment are: the height of the tallest man in history;
that dynamic radio completely superseded the magnetic; that pneumatic tires were more damaging
to highways than hard rubber tires. See Comment, 36 Mich. L. Rev. 610 (1938).
"Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937).
1390 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936).
"4Railroad Comm'n v. McDonald, 90 S.W.2d 581 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936); Pennsylvania R.R.
v. United States, 40 F.2d 921 (W.D. Pa. 1930).
'" United States v. Abilene & So. Ry., 265 U.S. 274 (1924).
16 West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 42 F.2d 899 (N.D. Ohio 1928).
17227 U.S. 88 (1913).
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given the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses, to inspect any documents relied upon, and to offer evidence in explanation or rebuttal of the
evidence officially noticed. In one case, Mr. Justice Cordozo stated that to
deny these rights to the parties would constitute "a condemnation without
18
trial.
A further objectionable feature of official notice is that a court on review may be left without any basis for determining the evidence upon
which the agency reached its decision. Mr. Justice Cordozo said in West
Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n 9 that for judicial review of the
administrative agency's decision to be of any consequence, "the record
must exhibit in some way the facts relied upon by the court to repel unimpeached evidence submitted for the company. If that were not so, a
complainant would be helpless, for the inference would always be possible
that the court and the commission had drawn upon undisclosed sources of
information, unavailable to others."'
In the initial Northeast decision 1 the CAB, considering Northeast's
application for a permanent certificate, concluded that "the unsuccessful
nature of Northeast's operations to date, the lack of any substantial evidence that it will become successful in the future, the failure of the expected East Coast-Florida traffic growth to materialize, the fact that Eastern and National can meet the present needs of the market ... persuades
us that the public convenience and necessity do not require the present
authorization of a third New York-Florida carrier ...."'Upon review,
the court held that the reasons given by the Board for denial of Northeast Airlines' request were either irrelevant or inadequately developed.
The case was remanded for "further study" and a more explicit statement
of its initial decision. The Board, on remand, after receiving various briefs
from the parties but without reopening the evidence, rendered a new and
what it termed "complete recast" of its initial decision. The Board found

that the existing record was a sufficient basis for its decision. However,
the Board stated that before reaching a final conclusion on the matter, it
had deemed it appropriate to look to "more recent operating results and
traffic statistics in order to determine whether a different result was re-

quired or, at least, whether the proceeding should be reopened for further
explanation on the question of Northeast's prospects for economic operations." The Board concluded that this new evidence was used solely to
substantiate its initial decision and was not sufficient to warrant a reopening or reversal of its prior decision. It relied on Market St. Ry. v. Railroad
Comm'n' in which the Supreme Court held that there was no denial of a
fair hearing when the agency "in making its predictive findings went outs Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292, 300 (1937).
U.S. 63 (1935).
'9294
2
i1d. at 69.
2' 331 F.2d 579 (1st Cir. 1964).
22 New York-Florida Renewal Case, CAB Docket No. 12285, CAB Order No. E-19910 (15
Aug. 1963), affirmed on reconsideration, CAB Order No. E-20073 (8 Oct. 1963).
2' New York-Florida Renewal Case, CAB Docket No. 12285, CAB Order No. E-21 550 (1 Dec.
1964).
24324 U.S. 548 (1945).
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side the record to verify its judgment by reference to actual traffic figures
that became available only after the hearings closed."2 The primary assertion in Northeast's petition for review was that the Board, in considering
further evidentiary matters on which it based its decision, chose some factors and disregarded others and afforded Northeast no opportunity to rebut
or explain the matters introduced. Northeast relied upon Section 7 (d)
of the Administrative Procedure Act" and certain new evidence which it
wished to present before the court to rebut the adverse conclusions which
the Board had made." The First Circuit declared that section 7 (d) did
not require a hearing "to decide whether a hearing is warranted, 28 for
this was within the Board's discretion, and it could choose to look outside
the record in making its determination.' However, once the Board decided
to go outside the record, "it could not pick and choose, at least to the
extent of denying an objecting party the rights guaranteed, but by no
means created, by section 7(d) to rebut not only those matters it looked
to, but also the inferences which were sought to be drawn therefrom."3
The court distinguished Market St. Ry. a1 from the instant case because in
that case no prejudice was shown to have resulted from the Railroad
Commission's official notice of certain reports that it had compiled. 2
Having decided that the Board violated due process of law by not affording Northeast the opportunity to rebut or explain the evidence officially
noticed, the court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent
with its opinion." After this decision came down, the Board entered a
new order revoking all its outstanding decisions, both with respect to
Northeast and in regard to whether there should be three permanently
certified carriers on the New York-Florida route. The Board then requested the First Circuit to relinquish jurisdiction and to remand so that
"a complete review of the issues ... in the light of the most recent data""
could be commenced."2 The court, granting the Board's request, reasoned
that the pendency of a petition for judicial review of an administrative
order does not preclude an agency from taking further action with respect
to the matter under review, including reopening of the proceedings. More" Accord, Braniff Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 277 F.2d 334 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
2860 Stat. 241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006(d) (1964).
27 In general this consisted of more recent traffic figures, expert testimony, and testimony concerning the effect of the renewal proceedings on Northeast's air traffic in 1963

and 1964. North-

east Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 484, 486 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 845 (1965).
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
as Ibid.
" 324 U.S. 548 (1945).
32 The court stated: "Due process, of course, requires that commissions proceed upon matters

in evidence to the test of cross-examination and rebuttal. But due process dealswith matters of
substance and is not to be trivialized by formal objections that have no substantial bearing on the
ultimate rights of the parties." Id. at 562.
" At this time both Eastern Airlines and National Airlines filed motions to intervene on the
ground that the court was without the power to remand the case for further action. These motions were denied. It was the court's position that so long as these carriers were precisely aligned
with the Board, formal intervention was inappropriate. National Airlines, Inc. v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., Civil No. 63693, S.D. Fla., 10 Jan. 1964.
a Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 488, 489 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 845
(1965).
"SSee Anchor Line Ltd. v. FMC, 299 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
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over, when an agency seeks to take such action, it should move for appropriate disposition of the review proceedings pending the further action.'
In considering the Board's request that it relinquish its jurisdiction, the
court declared that it was not the court's function to supervise the manner
in which the Board conducts its proceedings. The retention of jurisdiction
upon the original remand was distinguished because at that time the order
to remand was for the purpose of enforcing Northeast's rights under section
7 (d). The court found that after the second remand, neither the necessity
nor the rationale for retaining jurisdiction was present."
Considering Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB 8 in light of previous
Supreme Court decisions, the question arises as to when an administrative
agency may properly go beyond the record for a material fact. Two
factors are deemed relevant in deciding this question: (1) the procedural
fairness to be afforded the parties, and (2) the need for free use of all
agency expertise. Agencies have used the device of official notice as an
expedient for drawing upon this expertise. The prime purpose for allowing an agency to officially notice certain material facts is to give the agency
the advantage of all pertinent available information as a basis upon which
to make its decision. When an administrative agency officially notices
established propositions of law, or its own previous decisions, or makes
determinations on questions of law or policy, these material facts need
not be incorporated into the record. The agency should have absolute discretion in determining whether fairness requires notification of the parties
when this evidence is officially noticed. These are facts of a legislative
nature and do not go directly to the center of the controversy; they are
"legislative facts." However, when an agency takes official notice of facts
which pertain directly to the parties and are, thus, vital to the controversy,
certain limitations must be invoked. The agency must advise the parties
of these assumed facts and give them an opportunity to rebut or explain
this evidence or inferences derived therefrom, for these are "adjudicatory
facts." It is only through these limitations that procedural fairness can
be properly balanced with the agency's use of official notice.

Ben J. Kerr, III
88

In each of the following unreported cases the Board vacated its orders under review by the

courts and then applied to the reviewing court for appropriate disposition of the review proceedings: National Airlines v. CAB, Civil No. 11383, D.C. Cir., 30 July 1952; Aaxico Airlines v.
CAB, Civil No. 18055, D.C. Cir., 17 Dec. 1963; National Motor Freight Traffic Ass'n v. CAB, Civil
No. 19188, D.C. Cir., 14 April 1965.
87 See note 33 supra. The court held that where the Board revoked its decisions, both with
respect to Northeast and as to whether the market would support three permanently certified
carriers on the New York-Florida route, and requested the court to remand for complete review
of issues in the light of the most recent data, alignment terminated and other carriers were accordingly permitted to respond to the Board's request. Eastern, feeling that its position was being
jeopardized by the CAB's reopening of the case, petitioned for writ of certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court and sought to enjoin the Board by court order from further proceedings
until this writ could be considered. The court of appeals refused to grant an injunction, stating
that Eastern would have to apply first to the Board and next to the Supreme Court (or a Justice
thereof) in order to obtain a stay. The court stated that it should be left to the Board's discretion
to decide whether the public interest warrants further delay in these proceedings. The Supreme
Court denied certiorari. Eastern Airlines v. Northeast Airlines, 382 U.S. 845 (1965).
38345 F.2d 488 (lst Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 845 (1965).

Flight Insurance - Policy Interpretation
Extent of Coverage

-

Salvatore Messina, a civilian employee of the Department of the Army,
purchased flight insurance before embarking upon a trip from Tachikawa
Air Force Base, Japan, to Washington, D.C., pursuant to government
travel orders. The policy provided coverage for "loss of life, limb or
sight and other specified losses resulting from accidental bodily injuries
received while a passenger on scheduled airlines and other specified conveyances or while on the premises of an airport to the extent herein provided." 1 Another clause further enumerated the flights which were specifically covered. This provision indicated that in addition to flights of
scheduled airlines, the only other flights covered were those which were
"by, or contracted for by, the Military Air Transport Service [MATS]
of the United States."' After purchasing the policy, Messina was transported from Tachikawa to Travis Air Force Base, California, by a commercial airliner arranged and paid for by MATS. Upon arrival at Travis,
Messina obtained a travel authorization from the United States Transportation Officer for a one-way flight from the International Airport at
San Francisco to Washington, D.C., via United Air Lines. Using his own
funds, Messina then purchased a ticket from Travis Transportation Company for an air taxi flight from Travis to San Francisco International, a
distance of sixty-seven miles. The air taxi company was a nonscheduled
airline whose authority to use base facilities derived from a "Revocable
Permit" issued by the military commander of Travis Air Force Base. The
air taxi crashed and Messina was killed. The district court concluded that
ambiguities in the policy could have produced Messina's reasonable belief
'A reproduction of the policy appears in Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Messina, 350
F.2d2 458, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966).
ibid.
'Messina v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1964), aff'd per
curiam, 350 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966). The court found two
types of ambiguities:
(1) Ambiguity of language:
(a) The provision superimposed upon the text of the policy limiting coverage to
scheduled airlines was difficult to read.
(b) There was a conflict between the provision limiting coverage to scheduled
flights and the provision extending coverage to all MATS flights whether
scheduled or not.
(c) The ordinary reader would be unlikely to distinguish between the technical
terms "scheduled" and "nonscheduled."
(d) The point of departure and the destination were listed in a "Schedule" in
the policy and references in the policy to the "Schedule" would have led
the ordinary person in Messina's position to believe that the entire trip was
covered.
(e) There was no provision in the policy expressly excluding intermediate air taxi
flights from coverage. (And even if there had been such a provision, it too
would have been ambiguous in view of the other ambiguities.)
(2) Ambiguity of situation produced by the fact that the policy was physically designed for mailing. Having mailed the policy to his wife, Messina could not con-
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that the policy did not exclude nonscheduled air taxi flights, and judgment
was accordingly entered for the plaintiff. In addition, the court found
that Messina could have reasonably relied on the "Revocable Permit"
issued to Travis Transportation Company by the base commander as being
a contract between the transportation company and MATS because the
base commander was an officer in MATS. Consequently, the fatal flight
was covered by the specific clause covering flights contracted for by
MATS. Defendant, Mutual Benefit Health and Accident Association,

appealed. Held: Aff'd, per curiam. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n
v. Messina, 350 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
In construing flight insurance policies the courts have utilized the
general rules of contract law with appropriate modifications.4 The words
of the policy are to be interpreted "according to their plain, ordinary,
and accepted sense in the common speech of men, unless it affirmatively
appears from the policy that a different meaning was intended."' The
court in the instant case gave much weight to the principle that ambigui-

ties should be construed against the drafter of the instrument.! The
principle of liberal construction in favor of the insured must be confined,
however, to the terms which are ambiguous, and the principle is not to be
extended to provisions which are, taken by themselves, clear and unequivocal.7 In determining whether a particular passage is ambiguous, the
courts have stated that words of a policy do not become ambiguous simply
because there is a dispute as to their meaning, even though the construction
of the words becomes a subject matter of litigation s However, once the
court concludes that a particular passage is ambiguous, the insurer cannot escape liability merely because the insurer's interpretation appears to
be a more likely interpretation of the intent of the parties than the interpretation asserted by the beneficiary. In order to recover, the beneficiary
must merely show that his interpretation is one which is itself not unreasonable.
suit it during his trip to determine the scope of coverage. Although there was no

evidence to that effect, the court ruled that insurer had not given Messina a
duplicate to be used for reference purposes. The facts were exclusively within
insurer's knowledge, and the insurer did not prove that it had provided a dupli-

cate.
See generally 44 C.J.S. Insurance §§ 289-336 (1945); Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 1041 (1951),
supplementing Annot., 155 A.L.R. 1026 (1945) dealing with construction and application of
aviation risk exclusion clauses in life and accident policies.
' New York Life Ins. Co. v. Atkinson, 241 F.2d 674, 676 (10th Cir. 1957); 44 C.J.S. Insurance
5 296 (1945).
6 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 297 (1945); 29 AM. JUR. Insurance § 258 (1960).
129 AM. JuR. Insurance § 260 (1960); 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 297(c) (1945):
The rule of strict construction against insurer does not mean that every doubt
must be resolved against insurer, and does not prevent or interfere with the parties'
manifest object and intent, as expressed in the plain and ordinary language of the
contract. The rule cannot be availed of under the guise of construction, to import
a nonexistent ambiguity or doubt into the policy or contract in order to resolve it
against the insurer. Accordingly, notwithstanding the rule of strict construction
against the insured . . . the court cannot . . . disregard the plain meaning and
intent of the language employed, or pervert it or exercise inventive powers with respect thereto, or give a strained, refined, or unnatural interpretation to the language,
beyond itsplain and ordinary meaning, and thereby make a new contract. ...
'Thomas v. Continental Cas. Co., 225 F.2d 798, 801 (10th Cir. 1955).
"Id. at 801; Continental Cas. Co. v. Warren, 152 Tex. 164, 254 S.W.2d 762, 763 (1953).
4
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The courts have been rather strict in the interpretation of clear and
explicit words in an insurance policy in most instances"e and have refused to allow the rule of liberal construction in favor of the insured to
become an authorization to deny the right of the insurer to effectually
limit the scope of coverage-even where ambiguous words were present."
However, there has been a departure from a strict construction in cases
in which the intent of the parties or the nature of their relationship required a more liberal construction. 2 In two such cases the courts refused
to give effect to express limitations of policy coverage because the circumstances surrounding the relationship between insurer and insured made
the entire policy ambiguous. In both cases the insured purchased the
flight insurance from vending machines located at the airport. In the
first of these cases, Lachs v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 1 a small placard on the
vending machine expressly limited coverage to "any scheduled airline."
The policy itself contained a similar limitation. Despite these explicit provisions, the court refused to give any effect to the insurer's patent attempt
to limit the scope of coverage because an ambiguity of situation had been
produced by the fact that the vending machine was situated near the
ticket counter of the nonscheduled airline from which the insured bought
her ticket.
In the second vending machine case,' 4 the court held that a nonscheduled
air taxi flight was covered by a policy purchased from a vending machine
even though the top portion of the policy explicitly limited coverage to
scheduled air carriers. The nature of the relationship between insured and
insurer created "special and unique circumstances" which formed the basis
of the court's decision: (1) the insured could not consult with the insurer
to determine the scope of coverage before he purchased the policy, (2)
10Thompson v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 16 II. App. 2d 159, 148 N.E.2d 9, cert. denied, 358 U.S.
837 (1958). The insured was killed as the result of the crash of an irregular air carrier maintaining
no schedule of flights between designated points. His death was not covered by a policy insuring
the life of a passenger killed while on an aircraft operated by a "scheduled air carrier." "The rule
of liberal construction of insurance policies in favor of the insured must yield to rules of reasonable
construction, and the rule construing ambiguous provisions against the insurer will not permit
perversion of the plain language to create an ambiguity where none in fact exists." Id. at 13. in
Thomas v. Continental Cas. Co., 225 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1955), the beneficiary of an airtrip
policy was not permitted to recover where the insured, who had departed for San Salvador on a
round-trip ticket with an open-end return, died in San Salvador while he was a passenger on a
private aircraft which collided in flight with a regularly scheduled commercial carrier.
" In New York Life Ins. Co. v. Atkinson, 241 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1957), the court ruled
that the word "crew" was ambiguous; however, the court refused to adopt the interpretation suggested by the plaintiff. It held that the geologist whose employment required that he run a scintillometer (an attachment to a telescope by which the image of a star is made to revolve to measure
the intensity of light emitted by the star) on an airplane was not a member of the crew of the
airplane because he had nothing to do with its operation.
2Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 189 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 1951). The court was confronted
with an insurance policy which provided for coverage of a substitute flight if the insured exchanged
the ticket originally purchased for another one covering all or any portion of the trip specified in
the original ticket. After obtaining the insurance policy, the insured purchased a ticket covering
substantially the same route as the ticket originally purchased, but he did not "exchange" tickets.
In deciding for the plaintiff, the court held that a basic purpose of the policy was to give coverage
for a substitute flight and that, consequently, the provision requiring exchange of the tickets should
not be given effect. The court, in effect, rewrote the express language of the policy in order to
effectuate an intent, as inferred by the court, to provide coverage for all substitute flights. This
case is noted in 36 MARQ. L. REv. 109 (1952), and in Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 1029 (1952).
13306 N.Y. 357, 118 N.E.2d 555 (1954).
" Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 27 Cal. 172, 38 Cal. App. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284 (1963).
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the words in the policy limiting its coverage to scheduled flights were
apparently excluded from his view before purchase, and (3) a proviso
in the policy instructed insured to mail the policy to his beneficiary.
Consequently, the insured must have been unaware of any limitation of
policy coverage before he bought the policy, and there was no opportunity for him to consult the policy while he was en route since he had
already mailed the policy home. 5 The court ruled for the plaintiff, then,
on the ground that an ambiguity of circumstance had deprived the insured of effective notice that a substitute flight, i.e., a nonscheduled air
taxi flight, might not come within the terms of the policy.
The instant case is apparently distinguishable on the facts from all
previous cases dealing with policies of flight insurance. In fact, the court
stated that "differences between the language of the insurance policy in the
present case and policies in other cases, cited by both plaintiff and defendant, make the other cases not persuasive on the issues presented in
the present case."'" Even more important, there is a clear distinction between the vending machine cases and the instant case in the nature of
the relationship between insurer and insured. Whereas in the vending
machine cases the insured was faced with a take-it-or-leave-it situation
in which he may very well not have been able to determine the scope of
coverage before purchase, the insured in the instant case could have read
the policy and discussed its coverage with the insurance company's agent
before he bought the policy. Thus, no strict analogies can be drawn
between previously decided cases and the instant case. The sole relevance
of these prior cases lies in delineating the manner in which air flight insurance policies have been analyzed and in formulating the principles
upon which the courts have relied.
In the instant case the court reached the conclusion that the flight in
question was covered on the basis of two theories: (1) in view of the
fact that the policy was ambiguous,' 7 the air taxi flight was covered because there was no specific clause expressly excluding air taxi flights from
coverage, and (2) the fatal flight was one which was contracted for by
MATS, and the policy explicitly provided for coverage of such flights.
Moreover, even if the flight was not "contracted for by MATS," the
plaintiff could have reasonably relied on the so-called "Revocable Permit"
issued by the base commander, an officer in MATS, as being such a contract. The ambiguities deemed present by the court came from a supposed
conflict in the policy language and from the fact that the policy was
physically designed for mailing so that the insured could not refer to the
policy during the trip to refresh his memory as to the scope of coverage
unless a duplicate had been furnished by the insurer.'8
1"Id. at 298.
6
" Messina v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865, 871 n.7 (D.D.C. 1964),
aff'd per curiam, 350 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966).
" Ambiguities deemed present by the court are set out note 3 supra.
" There was no proof that a duplicate had or had not been furnished, but the court ruled that
none had been furnished since the facts were peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant.
Messina v. Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n, 228 F. Supp. 865, 869 n.4 (D.D.C. 1964), af'd
per curiam, 350 F.2d 458 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert.denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966).
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The policy was deemed ambiguous in its exclusion from coverage of
nonscheduled flights even though an express warning, superimposed upon

the face of the policy, stated unequivocally that coverage was to be
limited to flights of scheduled airlines. 1 The warning was circumvented
by the court on the grounds that it was difficult to read and that it conflicted with a further provision extending coverage to all flights "contracted by MATS." The insuring clause set out explicitly the flights covered
by the policy, and every flight included therein was limited to scheduled
airlines except those contracted for by MATS. Nevertheless, the court
refused to give any effect whatsoever to the express limitations because
the distinction between "scheduled" and "nonscheduled" airlines was supposedly too difficult for the reader to grasp. Apparently, a new standard
was adopted, the standard of the "casual reader."" 9 The court indicated
that since the reader may not have read the policy carefully before he
bought it, may not have questioned insurer's agent as to the scope of
coverage, and may have sent the policy to his beneficiary without fully
understanding its terms, the provisions expressly and explicitly limiting
coverage to scheduled airlines should be given no effect whatsoever.
In light of the fact that the policy was deemed ambiguous, the court
proceeded to a determination of whether the fatal flight was included
within the express provision extending coverage to "air flights contracted
for by MATS." The base comander (who was an officer in MATS) had
issued a "Revocable Permit" to the Travis Transportation Company upon
certain specified conditions.' Neither party could revoke the agreement at
will, except upon thirty days notice. The agreement appears on its face to
be a binding contract supported by sufficient consideration. At any rate,
this seems to be the best argument enunciated by the court, and the court's
holding that the air taxi flight was covered would certainly seem more
logical if it had been based solely upon the clause extending coverage to
flights contracted for by MATS.
However, even assuming that there was a contract between the air taxi
service and the base commander, the conclusion does not necessarily
follow that there was a contract with MATS under the terms of the
insurance policy. The military officer who signed the agreement had dual
responsibilities: (1) as commander of the base, and (2) as an officer in
MATS. The policy provided for coverage of flights "contracted for by
MATS," yet MATS was not mentioned anywhere in the agreement. MATS
itself was not in control of the base. In fact, a few months before the
permit was signed, an officer in the Strategic Air Command (SAC) had
been the base commander. If the contract had been signed during the
'9Id. at 867: "Read carefully this policy is limited to aircraft accidents on scheduled airlines."
This provision was superimposed in green print upon the body of the provision specifying the extent
of coverage.
"Id. at 867: "A casual reader would be likely to fail to read the green type at all."
21 Travis Transportation Company was to be allowed to use the base facilities in return for
granting seating priority to military personnel, charging no more than maximum fare for passengers,
making a flight within two hours after securing its first passenger, and following a detailed set of
safety regulations.
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command of the SAC officer, would it have been a contract with SAC
or merely a contract with the military authorities? Assuming arguendo
that the "Revocable Permit" was a contract, is it not more reasonable to
conclude that it was a contract with the base commander solely in his
capacity as a military representative rather than in his capacity as an
officer in MATS? The court left this question unanswered without even
considering it, and concluded that the insured could have reasonably relied on the "Revocable Permit" as being a contract with MATS whether
it was or not."
The primary objection to the decision reached in Messina lies in the
approach taken by the court in interpreting the terms of the policy.
During the course of its analysis of the supposed ambiguities, the court
blandly interjected, "It is hornbook law that ambiguities in a standardform contract are generally to be resolved against the party who drafted
the instrument." The court somehow failed to delve past the black letter
headings, however, for it neglected to note that the rule of liberal construction should apply only in construing particular words that are ambiguous and should not be extended to apply in interpreting a policy in
its entirety. Rather than construing particular words in the policy, the
court simply refused to give effect to language which appears perfectly
clear.' No provision in the policy could have conceivably been construed
so as to extend coverage to nonscheduled flights except the clause covering
flights "contracted for by MATS." The court could have found a conflict between the clause which covered all flights by MATS and the warning clause which limited policy coverage to flights of scheduled airlines.
Upon such a finding, the court should have applied the rule of liberal
construction to this ambiguity and interpreted the policy to cover nonscheduled airlines if they had been contracted for by MATS. In view of
the fact that the air taxi flight was nonscheduled, the proper focal issue
of the case was whether there was, in fact, a contract between MATS
and the Travis Transportation Company. However, instead of limiting
the application of the rule of liberal construction to the ambiguous provisions alone, the court deemed the rule relevant in interpreting the entire policy and, in effect, held that all flights of all airlines were covered
by the policy.
It is submitted that the insurance company in the present case clearly
intended to limit air flight coverage to scheduled airlines and airlines
2 Even if the court had been correct in applying a rule of reasonable reliance to the words
"contracted for by MATS," it is difficult to see how Messina could have reasonably relied upon a
purely private document issued by the base commander as being a MATS contract. As dissenting
Judge Burger stated in the court of appeals, "he (Messina) simply would not have known of such
arrangements." Thus, "the first part of the District Court's opinion-that dealing with Messina's
possibly being misled by ambiguities-cannot come to the aid of the second part-the agonizingly
strained interpretation which construes the revocable permit into a MATS contract ....
" Mutual
Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Messina, 350 F.2d 458, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 908 (1966).
' See authorities, cited note 7 supra.
24 In the words of Judge Burger, "if those provisions are ambiguous, there are no unambiguous
insurance policies." Mutual Benefit Health & Acc. Ass'n v. Messina, 350 F.2d 458, 460 (D.C. Cir.

1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 908 (1966).
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contracted for by MATS and that the insured had effective notice of
that intention. Yet the court twisted the language of the policy to the
point that all airline flights were covered thereunder. The finding of
supposed ambiguities and the liberal interpretation of the entire policy
amounted to an effective rewriting of the policy and a misapplication of
heretofore clearly-defined legal principles. Not only is this a derogation
of the intent of the parties, but it also breathes uncertainty into the legal
principles which are to be applied in construing flight insurance policies.
Michael M. Wade

Exculpatory Clauses -

Policy Interpretation

-

Validity

The United States leased an airfield' on Shemya Island, now a part of
the State of Alaska, to Northwest Airlines pursuant to the authority
granted the Administrator of the Civil Aeronautics Administration.! The
lease required the lessee to maintain public air navigation facilities.' Northwest executed a contract with Alaska Airlines [hereinafter Alaska] by
which Alaska acquired the right to use the Shemya airport and its facilities. According to a clause in this contract, Alaska was to "hold harmless
and indemnify Northwest... from all claims and liabilities ... which may
...arise out of or be in any way connected with the service and facilities
furnished to Alaska under this agreement." Subsequently, one of Alaska's
aircraft crashed, killing six members of the crew. Alaska sued for damage
to its aircraft on the ground that Northwest's negligence was the sole
proximate cause of the disaster. Six other damage suits were brought against
Northwest for deaths of the crewmen. Northwest then instituted the
present suit seeking a judicial declaration that it was exempted from
liability by the exculpatory clause of the contract and that the indemnity
clause required Alaska to defend the six death actions. Held: The exculpatory-indemnity provision is free of any ambiguity, but it is against public
policy and, thus, invalid and unenforceable. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v.
Alaska Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1965).
In general, the principle of contractual freedom does not prevent invalidation of contracts which exempt a party from liability for his own
negligence.' An exemption clause is usually void if it contravenes a statutory provision or an overriding consideration of public policy.' The public
policy prohibition against contractual exemption from liability for acts
of negligence has been applied in cases in which there is a duty of public
'On 30 September 1955, the United States, acting through the Administrator of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration, leased the facility to Northwest. At that time the United States was
the owner of, and had jurisdiction over, the Island of Shemya. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest
Airlines, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 322, 323 (D. Alaska 1964), aff'd, 351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1965).
'International Aviation Facilities Act 5 473, 62 Stat. 450 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 1159 (1964).
This section provides, in part, that "the Administrator is empowered . . . (3) to lease under such
conditions as he may deem proper ... "
a Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253, 255 (9th Cir. 1965). The
lease required that the airfield be public in nature. "Whereas, it is considered to be in the public
interest that said air navigation facilities at Shemya be available to the aeronautical public on a
non-discriminatory basis...."
' Ibid. The contract provided as follows:
4. Alaska agrees to hold harmless and indemnify Northwest, its officers, agents, contractors, servants and employees from all claims and liabilities for damage to, loss
of, or destruction of any property of Alaska, its officers, agents, servants and employees, and the property of any other person or persons, and for injuries to or death
of any person or persons which may now or hereafter arise out of or be in any way
connected with the service and facilities furnished to Alaska under this agreement.
'Checkley v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 257 Ill.App. 491, 100 N.E. 942 (1913).
6Shafer v. Reo Motors, Inc., 205 F.2d 685 (3rd Cir. 1953). See also, Annot., 175 A.L.R. 8
(1948).
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service or where a public interest is involved.7 Moreover, the social relationship of the parties may require that the legal rights of the parties not
be changed by an exculpatory clause regardless of the intent manifested
by the contractual agreement. '
Contractual exemption from liability for negligence is rarely allowed
where the contracting parties are not on roughly equal bargaining terms.'
This rule is operative in situations in which groups requiring public or
semi-public services need protection from monopolistic groups supplying
such services." Since contractual provisions which seek to relieve a contracting party from liability for his own negligence tend to induce want
of care, it is a judicial rule that the exemption clause will be strictly construed against the party relying on it." General words alone do not necessarily impart an intent to hold an indemnitor liable to an indemnitee for
damages resulting from the sole negligence of the latter.1 Because the obligation imposed is so extraordinary and harsh, the courts will not allow
a presumption that the parties intended to exculpate or indemnify the
other. 3 In order to be given effect, such an intention must be expressed
inclear and unequivocal terms.'
The contract in the present case provided that Alaska would "hold
harmless and indemnify Northwest . . . from all claims and liabilities"
arising out of the services or facilities furnished by Northwest." The district court' concluded that these words were not sufficiently definite to
exonerate Northwest from liability for its sole negligence. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and concluded that the
words were clear and unequivocal and contained no ambiguity
in exempt7
negligence.'
own
its
for
liability
from
Northwest
ing
Though the exculpatory-indemnity clause was ruled unambiguous, the
Ninth Circuit, nevertheless, held that it was against public policy and,
thus, invalid and unenforceable. The court relied on a similar case, Air
Transport Ass'n v. United States," in which an aircraft crashed into a
truck negligently parked on a runway. In Air Transport the exculpatory
provision was held invalid because the airport was "engaged in a public
or quasi-public service or enterprise."" Moreover, the instant decision was
based upon the general law governing this type of agreement as set out in
the Restatement of Contracts:
'Pride

v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 244 S.C. 615, 138 S.E.2d 155 (1964).

'Cf. Kenney v. Wong Len, 81 N.H. 427, 128 AtI. 343 (1925).
'Pride

v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 244 S.C. 615, 138 S.E.2d 155 (1964).
Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963). These
monopolistic groups naturally occupy the dominant bargaining position.
"Owen v. Vic Tanny's Enterprises, 48 IlI. App.2d 344, 199 N.E.2d 280 (1964); see, e.g.,
Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 143 S.E.2d 279 (1965).
" United States v. Wallace, 18 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1927).
"3Perry v. Payne, 217 Pa. 252, 66 Atd. 553 (1907).
4
' Kinkaide v. Liebowitz, 20 App. Div.2d 812, 248 N.Y.S.2d 685 (1964).
"Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253, 255 (9th Cir. 1965).
"eAlaska Airlines, Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 228 F. Supp. 322 (D. Alaska 1964), aff'd,
351 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1965).
"'Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 351 F.2d 253, 256 (9th Cir. 1965).
"Air Transport Ass'n v. United States, 221 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1955).
'9Id. at 472.
'ODixilyn
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A bargain for exemption from liability for the consequences of a willful
breach of duty is illegal, and a bargain for exemption from liability for the
consequences of negligence is illegal if .

.

. (b) one of the parties is charged

with a duty of public service, and the bargain relates to negligence in the
performance of any part of its duty to the public, for which it has received
or been promised compensation.'

In addition, the court in the present case analogized the instant facts
to those found in other cases involving a public service or enterprise such as
Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp." The problem in that case was whether
the owners of a tugboat could contract away their liability for negligence. The Bisso Court, in ruling that such a contract was against public policy, held that the purpose of the creation and application of
such a rule was " (1) to discourage negligence by making wrongdoers pay
damages, and (2) to protect those in need of goods or services from being
overreached by others who have power to drive hard bargains."" Thus, the
holdings of Air Transport" and Bisso' establish a rule that all contract
provisions exculpating a party engaged in a public service or enterprise
will categorically be declared invalid.
Northwest based its principal contention on Southwestern Sugar &
Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp." In that case the Court was confronted with an exculpatory clause in a tariff contract which was "subject to the pervasive regulatory authority of an expert administrative
body." The Court decided that the clause was not void as a matter of
law and that the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) should determine its validity. Courts frequently rely on the specialized knowledge of
administrative agencies as a means of gathering pertinent information
used to resolve legal questions.27 The tariff contract in River Terminals
contained rate differentials which provided the basis for including or excluding the exculpatory clause. This method of rate-setting relieved "the
towboat owner of the expense of insuring itself against liability for damage." s The Court intimated that public policy might demand that the
"0RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 575 (1) (1932).
2349 U.S. 85 (1955).
22
d. at 91.
23See text accompanying notes 18 and 19 supra.
24See text accompanying note 22 supra.
2360 U.S. 411 (1959).
21Id. at 417.
27 Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75

(1952). The Court set out the
rule of judicial deference to the expertise of an administrative agency.
[A] principle, now firmly established, that in cases raising issues of fact not within
the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should
not be passed over. This is so even though the facts after they have been appraised by
specialized competence serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined. Uniformity and consistency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary
are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertaining and interpreting
the circumstances underlying legal issues to agencies that are better equipped than
courts by specialization, by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible
procedure.
28 360 U.S. 411, 418 (1959). If the rate charged was high, the owner was financially able to
acquire insurance; if low rates prevailed, the exculpatory clause became operative and provided
an equal amount of protection.
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party seeking River Terminals' services should not receive the benefit of
the lower tariff rate and, at the same time, be exempt from the exculpatory
provision in the contract."' The Court concluded that the regulatory control of the ICC could effectively restrain the tugboat from extracting
high tariff rates while at the same time exempting itself from liability for
its own negligence. ' Realizing the need for an understanding of the economics of the problem, the Court deferred to the expertise of the ICC
for resolution of the question.
Basing its argument on River Terminals, Northwest contended that the
exculpatory-indemnity provision should be upheld because the contract
containing the provision had been approved by the CAB. However, the
court refused to hold that the CAB had placed beyond judicial scrutiny a
clause which the court considered detrimental to the public interest. Apparently, the court concluded that the rule enunciated in River Terminals
was inapplicable to the present facts because the agency control in River
Terminals was much more pervasive than was that of the CAB in the
present case.31
Despite the fact that the instant case is distinguishable on the facts from
River Terminals in the degree of control actually exercised by the respective regulatory bodies, apparently there was no fEnding that the CAB
does not possess the capacity to make the same sort of determination as
that made by the ICC in River Terminals. The court's holding seems,
rather, to be that since the CAB failed to review sufficiently the clause
in question, the court would do so itself in light of public policy considerations.
Certainly the CAB has expertise in the field of economic regulation,
and the courts would be expected to allow the Board to apply that expertise in much the same manner as did the ICC in River Terminals. Thus,
an exculpatory clause might be upheld if it has been found by the CAB
to be economically feasible and free of economic coercion. In the instant
case Northwest, by virtue of its lease from the Government, had control of all air facilities on Shemya Island. Alaska sorely needed these
facilities for landing and refueling its planes. Thus, as was noted by the
court,2 Northwest was in the much stronger, and even coercive, bargaining position. Yet the CAB apparently did not consider this factor in
approving the contract and its exculpatory-indemnity provision.
Should the CAB initiate a practice of closely scrutinizing all exculpatoryindemnity clauses before granting approval of each contract, it is conceivable that a contract containing such a clause might not be struck
down by the judiciary. The clause must be a true representation of the
economic realities of the relationship between the contracting parties and,
consequently, must be free of economic coercion. However, it is submitted
that the public policy of placing the responsibility for damage where the
29 Ibid.

"Ibid.
" Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 351
32

Id. at 257-58, n.2.

F.2d 253, 257 (9th Cir. 1965).
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fault lies is properly a strong consideration, especially, in the area of
public services. Thus, it is difficult to visualize circumstances, economic
or otherwise, which would justify CAB ratification of an exculpatoryindemnity clause in a contract similar to the one in the present case.
Patrick 0. Waddel
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transportation statutes, Congress intended to give the agencies considerable discretionary authority in most instances to draw their conclusions
solely on the basis of the relevant facts present in each case.8 However,
Section 102 of the Federal Aviation Act' limits the wide discretion of the
Board somewhat and adds a degree of content to section 401 (g) by providing several factors to be considered "in the public interest, and in
accordance with the public convenience and necessity." Section 102 directs
the Board to consider the encouragement and development of an airtransportation system properly adapted to the present and future needs
of commerce; the fostering of sound economic conditions; and the promotion, encouragement, and development of civil aeronautics."t The problem faced by the Board, then, is not merely how to make air-transportation
readily available to the greatest number of people, but rather how to do
so in accordance with sound economic conditions in the air transportation industry.'
The New England Regional Airport Investigation," instituted on 23
March 1962, was the first in a series of investigations following issuance
of the previously mentioned joint press release. The Board's order instituting the investigation adopted a set of goals and standards to be considered
in the Board's decisional process. In general, these guidelines concern traffic,
airport accessibility, airport capabilities, and cost."3
Traffic experience, in many instances, determines the weight to be given
all these guidelines, and is thus a very important consideration. " The term
accessibility encompasses such matters as travel time between the airport
and the locale being served, availability of public and private transportation, weather, geography, and road conditions."5 Airport capability includes such matters as an airport's present condition, its ability to be
transformed into an acceptable regional airport, and the practicality of
building a new regional airport." Finally, the most salient area of inquiry
is the cost to all concerned-the communities, the carriers, and the general
'See, e.g., United States v. Detroit & Cleveland Nav. Co., 326 U.S. 236, 241 (1945); ICC v.
Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 65 (1945).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 102, 72 Stat. 740, 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1964).
"0Ibid.
"See,
e.g., ICC v. J-T Transp. Co., 368 U.S. 81 (1961); Schaffer Transp. Co. v. United
States, 355 U.S. 83 (1957); Michigan Consol. Gas Co. v. FPC, 283 F.2d 204 (D.C. Cir. 1960);
Pacific Far E. Line, Inc. v. FMB, 275 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Pittsburgh v. FPC, 237 F.2d
741 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Democratic Printing Co. v. FCC, 202 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1952); and Commercial
Transp., Inc. v. United States, 173 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. Ill. 1959).
2
1 CAB Docket No. 13494, CAB Order No. E-18146 (23 March 1962).
" The guidelines set forth have been reaffirmed in subsequent orders. See, e.g., Eastern N.C.
Area Airline Serv. Investigation, CAB Docket No. 13728, CAB Order No. E-18727 (21 Aug.
1962). The guidelines are more explicitly delineated in the second Board order instituting a regional
airport investigation. North Cent. Area Airline Serv. Airport Investigation, CAB Docket No. 13743,
CAB Order No. E-18533 (29 June 1962).
14Ibid. Another aspect of traffic is frequency of service. When this can be improved, "a factor
favorable to the institution of an area airport exists." Furthermore, considerable weight is given to
the air traffic pattern of points to be served through area airports. Regional airports should be located so as to avoid a situation where the passenger must "backhaul" a substantial distance to the
airport to fly to his destination.
ia North Cent. Area Airline Serv. Airport Investigation, CAB Docket No. 13743, CAB Order
No. E-18533 (29 June 1962).
1e Ibid.
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public. 7 However, these factors are mere guidelines and are not necessarily determinative. They are to be carefully weighed in each proceeding,
but the final Board decision is to be made "on the record."'"
Another important factor the Board considers is the "use it or lose it"
policy," which stipulates that a city cannot expect to continue receiving
subsidized local air service unless it achieves and maintains an average of
at least five enplaned passengers per day. Despite the fact that every
commercial airport must comply with the five passenger minimum, mere
compliance therewith does not guarantee service."' Consequently, this
policy does not establish a catagorical rule upon which regional airport
decisions will be based. Nevertheless, it does provide a significant Board
consideration.
In addition, the Board has adopted a policy of suspending or deleting
trunkline service in favor of local-service carriers. Correspondingly, a
proclivity has been evinced in recent Board decisions to permit trunkline carriers to withdraw from short-haul markets where significant benefits are to be attained and where the withdrawal can be accomplished
without an undue adverse effect upon the traveling public." Technological
developments have compelled trunkline carriers to convert to jet equipment which allows them to provide better service in long-haul, high
density markets but which also makes the servicing of short-haul traffic
very expensive. The deletion of trunkline services, with a corresponding
consolidation at regional airports, results in a diminution in the need for
local-service carrier subsidy requirements and in an enhanced ability of
local-service carriers to provide better service, with greater economy, than
was possible during trunkline competition. 2
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW

Section 1006 of the Federal Aviation Act' provides the right to appeal
a Board order to any person disclosing a substantial interest. When judicial
jurisdiction has been invoked, the court has exclusive authority to affirm,
modify, or set aside the Board's order and require further proceedings.24
'" Ibid. Community cost relates to such items as the availability of ground transportation and
the need for new facilities. Carrier costs include the system and local station expenses and those
costs created by changes in equipment which might be used at the regional airport. Public costs
include subsidies and the funds expended in airport facility or public highway construction.
" Ibid.
"The policy was first enunciated in Seven States Area Investigation, 28 C.A.B. 680, 755-57
(1958). For a judicial description of the policy, see Nebraska Dep't of Aeronautics v. CAB, 298
F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1962).
20 14 C.F.R. § 399.11 (1965). The statement is negative in form and tells who will not receive
air service rather than who will.
"Such a situation might arise where trunklines and local carriers service the same route.
See, e.g., American Airlines Serv. to Akron, CAB Docket No. 12438, CAB Order No. E-19259
(31 Jan. 1963); Southwestern Area Local Serv. Case, CAB Docket No. 10758, CAB Order No.
E-19254 (30 Jan. 1963); Service at Peoria and Springfield, Ill., CAB Docket No. 11482, CAB
Order No. E-18446 (13 June 1962); and Roanoke Serv. by American, CAB Docket No. 11801,
CAB Order No. E-18124 (19 March 1962).
"See City of Lawrence v. CAB, 343 F.2d 583, 589 (Ist Cir. 1965).
aFederal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1006(a), 72 Stat. 795, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a)

(1964).
"4Federal

(1964).

Aviation Act of 1958, § 1006(d), 72 Stat. 795, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(d)
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However, findings of fact, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive, and in no instance will an objection to an order be considered unless the same was urged before the Board or unless failure to do so was based
upon reasonable grounds.' Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure
Act' states that the reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions of
law. Furthermore, the court must set aside agency action, findings, and
conclusions which it finds to be unsupported by substantial evidence, determined without observance of proper legal procedure, arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with law."7
When reviewing Board determinations, courts have frequently rejected
allegations of inconsistencies between the action under review and prior
decisions because the variety of circumstances to which the agency must
apply the general statutory criteria render prior cases generally inapplicable. " Exceptions have been made in two sets of circumstances: (1) when
an agency fails to explain intelligibly the relationship between the facts
found and the result reached, and (2) when a prior case has announced a
definite standard which is apparently applicable and which the agency,
without explanation, neglects to follow.
An intelligible statement by the Board is necessary to enable a reviewing court to determine if the findings are supported by substantial evidence.s This requirement forms the essence of Section 8(b) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 1 which requires the Board to set forth its
findings and conclusions as well as its reasons or bases therefor." A bare
assertion of administrative expertise cannot fill the vacuum of inadequate
findings." In M &.M Transp. Co. v. United States,' Judge Magruder
22Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 1006(e), 72 Stat. 795, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1486(e)
(1964).
2"Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 60 Stat. 243 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1009 (1964).
27Ibid.
"SSee, e.g., FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946); North Cent. Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
265 F.2d 581 (DC.. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 903 (1959); State Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 174 F.2d
510 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 338 U.S. 572 (1950); and M & M Transp. Co. v.
United States, 128 F. Supp. 296 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 350 U.S. 857 (1955). As stated in Virginia

Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658, 665 (1926), the courts have "no concern with alleged
inconsistency with [administrative] findings made in other proceedings."

2 Boston & Me. R.R. v. United States, 202 F. Supp. 830 (D. Mass. 1962), aff'd per curiam,
sub nom., Baltimore & 0. R.R. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 373 U.S. 372 (1963).

3 In United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pa. R.R., 294 U.S. 499, 511 (1935), Justice
Cardozo stated: "[W]e must know what a decision means before the duty becomes ours to say
whether it is right or wrong."
" Administrative Procedure Act § 8(b), 60 Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1964).
32See, e.g., Secretary of Agriculture v. United States, 347 U.S. 645 (1954); City of Lawrence

v. CAB, 343 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1965); and Northeast Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 331 F.2d 579 (1st Cir.

1964).
"sSee ICC v. J-T Transp. Co., 368 U.S. 81, 93 (1961); Public Serv. Comm'n v. United
States, 356 U.S. 421, 427 (1958). On the other hand, a Board decision on public convenience
and necessity requires the exercise of that sort of judgment about future events in which the
much discussed expertise of administrative agencies finds its greatest value. This is where a
rationally determined conclusion has its greatest applicability despite differences of opinion. See,
e.g., Airport Comm'n v. CAB, 300 F.2d 185, 186 (4th Cir. 1962). In North Cent. Airlines, Inc.
v. CAB, 265 F.2d 581, 584 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 903 (1959), the court, dealing
with airline mergers, declared that problems of public convenience and necessity "cannot be
solved by mathematical computations. Judgment necessarily enters into each one, and the Congress
has given the agency power to exercise that judgment." See also American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB,
192 F.2d 417, 420 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
34 12 8 F. Supp. 296, 301 (D. Mass.), aft'd, 350 U.S. 857 (1955).
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noted that the issue is the adequacy of the agency's findings in the particular factual context to satisfy the statutory test, not its relation to
other agency determinations in other facual contexts. Judge Magruder
distinguished Secretary of Agriculture v. United States," where an order
was vacated primarily for inadequacy of the Commission's findings. The
Court in that case was unable to determine what the Commission intended
by its order, and when the Court looked at prior decisions, it found them
inconsistent with the administrative decision under consideration. The
Court in Secretary of Agriculture, then, considered prior cases because
the agency failed to comply with section 8 (b) ; that is, it did not properly
set forth its findings, conclusions, and intelligible reasons or bases therefor.
IV.

RECENT DECISIONS

Two significant recent decisions from the First and Seventh Circuits
help to delineate the steps which must be taken by the Board in order

to meet judicial approval. As of late 1964, home airport service by
local-service carriers had been terminated by the Board at nearly 230
locations." City of Lawrence v. CAB 7 was the first case to judicially reverse such administrative action. There the court struck down an order
consolidating service in one regional airport largely for failure of the
Board to meet the requirements of section 8 (b) in that there was an inexplicable inconsistency between the Board's findings and its conclusions.
As a consequence, the court considered an earlier Board decision, Northeastern States Area Investigation," which involved essentially the same
question. This decision enunciated a definite rule which was apparently
contra to the result reached in Lawrence. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further consideration in compliance with section 8 (b), that
is, for an intelligible statement of the factors considered, issues decided,
and reasons supporting the conclusion."
A more recent decision, Outagamie County v. CAB," exemplifies proper
Board application of the regional airport policy. In Outagamie the Board
complied with the statutory criteria and guidelines laid down in the investigation order. The requirements of section 8 (b) were satisfied, and
there were no prior, unexplained cases establishing a decisional rule on
essentially the same point. The court concluded " that the Board did
sufficiently "narrow, clarify, and explain" the "general directive" of public
convenience and necessity "to the point of affording a fair degree of predictability of decision in the great majority of cases, and of intelligiblity
in all."
"'347 U.S. 645 (1954).
"Brief for Respondent, p. 29, Outagamie County v. CAB, 355 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1966).
"7343 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1965).
"830 C.A.B. 606 (1959).
"'City of Lawrence v. CAB, 343 F.2d 583, 588 (1st Cir. 1965). The Board's decision was
based in part on the policy of permitting trunkline carriers to withdraw from short-haul markets
in favor of local-service carriers. The First Circuit, however, distinguished proper application of
this policy from the erroneous application in Northeastern.
40355 F.2d 900 (7th Cir. 1966).
4 Id. at 908 (quoting from City of Lawrence v. CAB, 343 F.2d 583, 587 (Ist Cir. 1965)).
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V.

CONCLUSION

A comparison of the press release statement with the statutory criteria
which Congress laid down for the Board's operations indicates that the
regional airport policy originally emerged as hardly more than a statement of the Board's intention to discharge its statutory obligations by
serving the public interest. Though the Board has been vested with wide
discretion, the regional airport policy does evince a recognition of the
need for modification of prior existing policies in light of technical changes
taking place in the airline industry.' Reasonably broad statutory standards
in initial legislative grants to administrative agencies are proper when dealing with a novel field.' Mr. Justice Jackson has stated that there is a
"malaise in the administrative scheme" when Congress grants authority
under a broad and undefined standard such as "public convenience and
necessity."" When the initial standard is vague, it is the agency's duty to
define and clarify it, "to canalize the broad stream into a number of
narrower ones" so as to afford predictability."'
It is apparent that, in the application of the regional airport policy,
considerable discretion will continue to be exercised by the Board with
judicial approval, but this should not be the finis. The Board should advance a policy statement when suflicient experience has been accumulated
for a proper formulation. Though the Board has singled out factors which
enter into the decisional process, it has not been able to generalize as to
relationships between those factors. Of course, standards and specific decisional rules are desirable when they represent a distillation of the Board's
expert knowledge in this area, but the process must be allowed to take
its course." In the meantime, the Board must continue its present approach
of balancing all material factors relevant to the "public convenience and
necessity" without categorical rules to regiment the decision-making
process.

Edward S. Koppman

" See Airport Comm'n v. CAB, 300 F.2d 185, 187 (4th Cir. 1962).
4' FRIENDLY,

THE

FEDERAL

ADMINISTRATIVE

AGENCIES:

THE NEED

FOR BETTER

DEFINITION

OF STANDARDS 14 (1962).
44See FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 482 (1952); FRIENDLY, Op. cit. supra note 43.
45 FRIENDLY, Op. cit. supra note 43.

4 In Lawrence, the First Circuit was critical of the Board's failure to evince and follow
sufficiently definite standards in the exercise of its discretion, but the court also explicitly stated
that it did not intend to criticize the Board's policy. Moreover, this defect in the proceedings
was not considered a basis for reversal. A permissible interpretation of the First Circuit's criticism

of the Board for failure to develop standards is that such failure is not error per se but is merely
conducive to the improper application of the regional airport policy.
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RECENT DECISIONS
FEDERAL AVIATION ACT CHATTEL MORTGAGESFEDERAL RECORDATION
State Securities Company (hereinafter referred to as lender) provided an
aircraft dealer with short-term financing of customer aircraft purchases
secured by chattel mortgages. It was the practice of the dealer to sell an
aircraft, repay the loan, and then obtain a release of the chattel mortgage.
In the instant case, the lender, although aware of this practice and consenting to it, failed to register the chattel mortgages here involved with the
FAA in accordance with Section 503 of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.' The dealer sold a plane to Owens Metal Company (hereinafter
referred to as purchaser), but did not, as was the customary practice,
apply the purchase money against the debt secured by the chattel mortgage. When the dealer defaulted on the note, the lender brought suit on
the chattel mortgage which allegedly encumbered the plane now in the
hands of the purchaser. Held: The purchaser is a good faith purchaser for
value in the ordinary course of business, and the lender waived its lien on
the chattel mortgage by failing to record it with the FAA. State Securities
Co. v. Aviation Enterprises, Inc., 355 F.2d 225 (10th Cir. 1966).
The result was seemingly based primarily on the doctrine of estoppel.
The court found that the purchaser had no knowledge of the mortgage
since it was not recorded with the FAA and that there were not sufficient
facts to put him on inquiry since he bought the aircraft in the ordinary
course of business. The lender had allowed the dealer to conduct its affairs
in such a manner so as to present to its customers an illusion of ownership
upon which its customers could, and did, rely. Thus, the court concluded
that the lender, by its conduct, was estopped to assert its lien against the
purchaser. The decision appears to indicate that registration of liens with
the FAA, being constructive notice to all of the existence of the lien, is
the simplest application of preventive medicine to cure the disease of an
inoperative lien.
D.L.P.

CARRIER- FEDERAL AVIATION ACT
LEASING OF AIRCRAFT

-

Defendant corporation was engaged in the business of leasing airplanes.
The leased aircraft were subject to the exclusive use of the lessees, although, in approximately ninety per cent of the leases, defendant furnished
the pilot and facilities. The United States sued to impose civil penalties and
to enjoin defendant from operating without certification from the Federal
Aviation Agency, contending that he was a carrier of persons and property
172 Stat. 772, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1403 (1964).
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for hire.1 Held: The purpose of the certification is to provide safe air
travel. Since the defendant normally provides his own pilots and facilities,
he is a carrier within the meaning of the agency regulation. United States
v. Bradley, 252 F. Supp. 804 (S.D. Tex. 1966).
Defendant asserted that it was the lessee of the airplane-not the lessorwho was the carrier. The court agreed that this might be the case if the
lessee furnished its own pilot, crew, and facilities. However, the court reasoned that when these additional services were furnished by the lessor, he
became a carrier. The holding is strengthened by two factors. First, the
Federal Aviation Act provides that "any person who causes or authorizes
the operation of aircraft, whether with or without the right of legal control" is deemed to be engaged in the operation of aircraft and subject to
the act.' Applied literally, the extent of services provided by the lessor
would seem immaterial. Second, although either or both the lessee and
lessor of aircraft could be required to comply with the certification requirements, simplicity is served in the instant case. Public policy would
seem to support the certainty which can be achieved by having the single
lessor meet and set safety procedures, rather than many separate lessees.
J.K.M.

NEGLIGENCE -

AIRWORTHINESS -

FEDERAL AVIATION AGENCY
Upon attaining a height of some 200 feet and retracting its landing
gear, a Beechcraft 9360 belonging to South Central Airlines stalled and
crashed shortly after take-off from the airport at Gainesville, Florida.
The retraction of the landing gear caused the center of gravity, which
was already too far to the rear, to be moved past the safety point so that
the plane could no longer stay airborne. Plaintiffs contended that the FAA
should be held liable because the agency inspectors were negligent in
approving, certifying, and licensing the plane's airworthiness after alterations and modifications had been made. Held: The FAA was negligent in
failing to properly inspect the airplane and in certifying its airworthiness.
However, according to the evidence, the plane was airworthy, and any
doubt as to this conclusion was dispelled by the fact that the plane had
flown the previous day. The sole proximate cause of the accident was the
pilot's error in overloading the craft and in positioning its load too far to
the rear when he had sufficient information from which he could have
determined the plane's center of gravity. Gibbs v. United States, 251 F.
Supp. 391 (E.D. Tenn. 1965).
The Administrator of the FAA is charged with the duty to promote
flight safety of civil aircraft by prescribing certain minimum standards
' 14 C.F.R. § 121.3(f) (1966).
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 101, 72 Stat. 737, as amended, 76 Stat. 143
U.S.C. § 1301(26)

(1966).

(1963),
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governing the design and performance of aircraft and aircraft engines.'
A registered owner of an aircraft may file an application with the Administrator for an airworthiness certificate. If the Administrator finds that
the aircraft is in safe operating condition, he shall issue the certificate.! It
is unlawful for any person to operate a civil aircraft without such a
certificate.' The Federal Aviation Act establishes standards of care to be
followed by the Administrator in certifying air carriers to engage in air
transportation." Pursuant to the act, "the Administrator shall exercise and
perform his duties under this chapter in such manner as will best tend to
reduce or eliminate the possibility of, or recurrance of, accidents in air
transportation . . . ."' The import of the instant decision is that even if
the Administrator is negligent in granting a defective airplane a certificate
to operate, that negligence is not the proximate cause of a subsequent
crash if the pilot could have avoided the crash through the exercise of
proper care.
M.M.W.

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT - DISMISSAL EXERCISE OF DISCRETION
Plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment suit in federal court seeking
to have the Warsaw Convention1 declared unconstitutional and a judgment
denying the defendant, Pan American World Airways, the right to use
the Convention as a defense in a contemplated wrongful death action
arising out of a crash of defendant's Boeing 707 in December 1963. This
latter state court action was not instituted until after Pan American had
moved to have the declaratory judgment suit dismissed. Held, motion
granted, suit dismissed: "This court, as a matter of discretion, declines to
exercise its jurisdiction." Rieger v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 3 Av. L.
REP. (9 Av. Cas.) 5 18,093 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
The court based its exercise of discretion on two theories. First, it felt
that to grant the relief sought, which would deny Pan American a major
facet of its defense, would be violative of the policy embodied in 28
U.S.C. § 2283,' which prohibits a federal court from enjoining state court
actions except in the aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its
judgment, or unless otherwise provided for by Congress. This statute has
' Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 601, 72
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 603 (c),
'Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 610(a),
" Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 601, 72
'Ibid.

Stat. 775, 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1964).
72 Stat. 776, 49 U.S.C. § 1423 (c) (1964).
72 Stat. 780, 49 U.S.C. § 1430(a) (1964).
Stat. 775, 49 U.S.C. § 1421 (1964).

Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to
Air (The Warsaw Convention), 12 Oct. 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S.
'Suit was instituted on the wrongful death action in the New
American filed its answer on 27 Jan. 1966, pleading the Warsaw
partial affirmative defense.
362 Stat. 968 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).

International Transportation by
876 (1934).
York Supreme Court, and Pan
Convention as a complete and
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generally been regarded as codifying a matter of comity between the
federal and state courts and as a means of preventing potential conflicts
between the two court systems. The exceptions to these policies, whereby
an injunction is allowed, have been narrowly construed. While the statute
itself may be open to question as a basis for dismissing a declaratory
judgment suit (because the court would not be enjoining a state court
action but merely foreclosing a matter of defense as to Pan American),
the policy behind the statute seems to be an adequate basis for dismissal.
Second, the court placed its exercise of discretion on the sounder ground
of avoiding fragmentized and disruptive litigation. Since the action in
state court could adjudicate all the rights and liabilities of the parties,
whereas the federal court suit could not, to allow the plaintiff to proceed would be to fragment and disrupt the litigation. It would seem that
the court soundly exercised its discretion, either as a matter of comity
and as a means of preventing potential conflict, or on the policy basis that
litigation between parties should not be fragmatized and drawn out in
several different courts where one forum is available to adjudicate all
the issues.
A.J.H. II

CAB - ADMINISTRATIVE LAW -

VENUE TRANSFER

The CAB issued an order for a complete reopening of proceedings on an
application by an air carrier for renewal of its temporary certificate.1 The
agency's order was subsequently appealed by the plaintiff, a competing
airline.' The Board then made a motion to dismiss the appeal or, in the
alternative, to transfer the petition for review to the First Circuit Court
of Appeals. Held, motion granted, suit transferred: If proceedings have
been instituted in two or more appellate courts with respect to the same
order, the Board shall file the record in the court in which the proceeding
with respect to said order was first instituted. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v.
CAB, 354 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
The court based its decision both on its inherent discretionary powers
and on a broad interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2112 (a). The court stated
that without regard to the authority provided by statute, a court of
appeals having venue may exercise an inherent discretionary power to
transfer the proceeding to another circuit "in the interest of justice and
sound judicial administration."' However, the court's inherent authority,
when not expanded by statute, permits transfer over objection only to
a court having proper jurisdiction and venue.4 Although the petitioner
does not have its domicile or principal place of business in the First Circuit,
'Northeast
2

Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 345 F.2d 484 (lst Cir. 1965).

New York-Florida Renewal Case, CAB Docket No. 12285, CAB Order No. E-22084 (26

April 1965).

'Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 354 F.2d 507, 510 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
4
Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 343 F.2d 905, 909 (8th Cir. 1965).
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the court thought that 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a) was available as authority
for the transfer. The terms of the statute had been met in that "proceedings have been instituted in two or more courts of appeals with respect
to the same order." Application of this statute, although not within the
specific contemplation of Congress, would be consonant with the general
congressional purpose of avoiding forum conflicts and forum shopping.
In the instant case, the statute was liberally applied to permit review by a
single court of closely related matters calling for sound judicial administration. Since the First Circuit had before it the entire record leading up
to its order of 26 April 1965, it would be in the best position to decide
matters in any way connected with the case.
B.J.K. III

